- Manipulability in school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2021,
Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
- Fair social ordering, egalitarianism, and animal welfare (with Marc Fleurbaey), 2021,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.
- Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment, (with Kristine Koutout, Andrew Dustan, and Myrna Wooders),
2021, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming.
- Matching soulmates (with Greg Leo, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders), 2021, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Conditionally Accepted.
- The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem (with Paul Edelman and John Weymark), 2021, Mathematical Programming, Conditionally Accepted.
- Bounded rationality and the choice of jury selection procedures, 2018,
Journal of Law and Economics, 61(4), 711-738.
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable, 2018,
International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 609–645.
- Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency, 2018,
Economic Theory Bulletin, 6(2), 219–238.
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes, 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 111-121.
- Fair social orderings with other-regarding preferences (with Benoit Decerf), 2016,
Social Choice and Welfare, 46(3), 655-694.
- Betting and belief: Prediction markets and attribution of climate change (with Jonathan Gilligan and John Nay), 2016, Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference.
- Exclusion of extreme jurors and minority representation: The effect of jury selection procedures, (with Andrea Moro), 2021.
- Capacity design in school choice, (with Umut Dur), 2021.