1. Manipulability in school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2021,
    Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
  2. Fair social ordering, egalitarianism, and animal welfare (with Marc Fleurbaey), 2021,
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(4), 466-491.
  3. Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment, (with Kristine Koutout, Andrew Dustan, and Myrna Wooders),
    2021, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming.
  4. Matching soulmates (with Greg Leo, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders), 2021, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 23(5).
  5. The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem (with Paul Edelman and John Weymark), 2021, Mathematical Programming, Conditionally Accepted.
  6. Bounded rationality and the choice of jury selection procedures, 2018,
    Journal of Law and Economics, 61(4), 711-738.
  7. Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable, 2018,
    International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 609–645.
  8. Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency, 2018,
    Economic Theory Bulletin, 6(2), 219–238.
  9. Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes, 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 111-121.
  10. Fair social orderings with other-regarding preferences (with Benoit Decerf), 2016,
    Social Choice and Welfare, 46(3), 655-694.
  11. Betting and belief: Prediction markets and attribution of climate change (with Jonathan Gilligan and John Nay), 2016, Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference.

Working papers

  1. Exclusion of extreme jurors and minority representation: The effect of jury selection procedures, (with Andrea Moro), 2021.
  2. Capacity design in school choice, (with Umut Dur), 2021.

Google Scholar.