- Manipulability in school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2020, Journal of Economic Theory, Conditionally Accepted.
- Fair social ordering, egalitarianism, and animal welfare (with Marc Fleurbaey), 2020, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.
- Bounded rationality and the choice of jury selection procedures, 2018,
Journal of Law and Economics, 61(4), 711-738.
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable, 2018,
International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 609–645.
- Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency, 2018,
Economic Theory Bulletin, 6(2), 219–238.
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes, 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 111-121.
- Fair social orderings with other-regarding preferences (with Benoit Decerf), 2016,
Social Choice and Welfare, 46(3), 655-694.
- Betting and belief: Prediction markets and attribution of climate change (with Jonathan Gilligan and John Nay), 2016, Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference.
Working papers (in order of progress)
- Trump trumps Bush: Electoral legitimacy in U.S. presidential elections (with Rafael Treibich), 2017. (Submitted)
- Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment, (with Kristine Koutout, Andrew Dustan, and Myrna Wooders), 2018. (Submitted)
- Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures, (with Andrea Moro), 2021.
- Matching soulmates (with Greg Leo, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders), 2016. (Submitted)
- The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem (with Paul Edelman and John Weymark), 2019. (Submitted)
- In search of advice for participants in constrained school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2017.
- Competing for priorities in school choice (with Greg Leo), 2018.