1. Manipulability in school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2020,                                        Journal of Economic Theory, Conditionally Accepted.
  2. Fair social ordering, egalitarianism, and animal welfare (with Marc Fleurbaey), 2020, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.
  3. Bounded rationality and the choice of jury selection procedures, 2018,
    Journal of Law and Economics, 61(4), 711-738.
  4. Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable, 2018,
    International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 609–645.
  5. Egalitarianism with a dash of fair efficiency, 2018,
    Economic Theory Bulletin, 6(2), 219–238.
  6. Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes, 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 73, 111-121.
  7. Fair social orderings with other-regarding preferences (with Benoit Decerf), 2016,
    Social Choice and Welfare, 46(3), 655-694.
  8. Betting and belief: Prediction markets and attribution of climate change (with Jonathan Gilligan and John Nay), 2016, Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference.

Working papers (in order of progress)

  1. Trump trumps Bush: Electoral legitimacy in U.S. presidential elections (with Rafael Treibich), 2017. (Submitted)
  2. Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment, (with Kristine Koutout, Andrew Dustan, and Myrna Wooders), 2018. (Submitted)
  3. Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures, (with Andrea Moro), 2021.
  4. Matching soulmates (with Greg Leo, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders), 2016. (Submitted)
  5. The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem (with Paul Edelman and John Weymark), 2019. (Submitted)
  6. In search of advice for participants in constrained school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2017.
  7. Competing for priorities in school choice (with Greg Leo), 2018.

Google Scholar.