Manipulability in school choice (with Benoit Decerf), 2021,
Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
Fair social ordering, egalitarianism, and animal welfare (with Marc Fleurbaey), 2021,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.
Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment, (with Kristine Koutout, Andrew Dustan, and Myrna Wooders),
2021, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming.
Matching soulmates (with Greg Leo, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders), 2021, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Conditionally Accepted.
The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem (with Paul Edelman and John Weymark), 2021, Mathematical Programming, Conditionally Accepted.
One of my favorite excerpt:
“Beyond a few cases of outright misconduct, these practices are rarely done to deceive. They’re an almost inevitable product of an academic world that rewards scientists, above all else, for publishing papers in high-profile journals—journals that prefer flashy studies that make new discoveries over duller ones that check existing work. People are rewarded for being productive rather than being right, for building ever upward instead of checking the foundations. These incentives allow weak studies to be published. And once enough have amassed, they create a collective perception of strength that can be hard to pierce.”
I am very happy to announce that, as of next academic year, I will be joining the faculty of the Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods at Emory University as a Visiting Assistant Professor.
I’ve had two very good years with the Department of Economic and Finance at Utah State University. It’s a great, growing department with lots of excellent and welcoming colleagues that I will miss. USU will always remain a special place for me and I certainly hope to be visiting Logan in the future.
I am very happy to announce that, as of next academic year, I will be joining the faculty of the Department of Economics and Finance at Utah State University as a Visiting Assistant Professor.
Patrick Prosser has some great java code at http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~pat/roommates/distribution/ which, among other things, can compute all the stable matchings in roommate problems.
If you are interested in two-sided matchings, rejoice : Patrick’s code allows preferences over roommates to include unacceptable roommates. To implement a two-sided market, just make sure any roommates on one side of the market views any other roommate on the same side of the market as unacceptable, and you’re good to go.
If (like myself) you are not used to java, you might struggle a little to get the code working. Here is a little tutorial for Mac OS, which worked for me as of today.